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Abstract 
This paper exploits the unique experiment of European market integration to in-
vestigate the relationship between integration and price convergence in international 
markets.  Using a  panel data set of car prices we  examine how the process of inte-
gration has affected cross-country price dispersion in Europe.  We find  surprisingly 
strong evidence of convergence towards both the absolute and the relative versions 
of Purchasing Power Parity.  Our analysis illuminates the main sources of segmenta-
tion in international markets and suggests the type of institutional changes that can 
successfully reduce it. 
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1 1  Introduction 
This paper uses the unique experiment of the European integration process to explore the 
link between integration and price convergence in international markets.  Few topics have 
attracted as  much attention and controversy in International Economics  as  the topic of 
convergence to the Law of One Price (LOOP). While until a few  years ago, one was hard-
pressed to find evidence in favor  of the convergence hypothesis, a number of recent papers 
claim that Purchasing Power Parity does hold in the long run,  with a  half-life of shocks 
of five  to six years (see  Obstfeld and Rogoff  (2000)  for  a  detailed discussion).  The new 
evidence comes primarily from  "bigger"  data sets - use of panel data sets as in Frankel 
and Rose (1996),  Parsley and Wei  (1996),  Cecchetti et al (2000),  etc"  or exploitation of 
longer time-series data for individual countries (see Taylor (2000a)  for an overview) - and 
methodological advances (Taylor 2000b).  Still, the slow speed of convergence documented in 
international markets remains a puzzle.  In their excellent study of price dispersion across 
U.S.  cities, Parsley and Wei  (1996)  report half-lives  of shocks of four to five  quarters for 
tradeables, a substantially shorter time than the aforementioned five to six years estimated 
in cross-country studies.  Engel and Rogers  (1996)  report that the border is  "2500 miles 
wide" , meaning that crossing the border adds as much to the volatility of prices as adding 
2500 miles between cities.  In a more recent study, Asplund and Friberg (2001) find that the 
LOOP does not even hold for identical goods sold at the same location, as long as these goods 
are denominated in different currencies (the evidence comes from price data of products sold 
in Scandinavian duty-free stores).While various  explanations have been suggested in the 
literature - with nominal exchange rate volatility being the primary contender - there is 
little agreement as to what factors generate international price dispersion in the first place, 
and what mechanisms can accelerate convergence to the LOOP. 
The goal of this paper is to shed light on the above question by focusing on a period that 
is characterized by a distinct effort to "integrate" national markets in Europe (1970-2000). 
The progress towards integration took the form of removal of trade barriers, encouragement 
- within limits - of arbitrage, harmonization of tax rates and other national regulations, 
2 increased transparency, monitoring of cross-country price differences, and, with the creation 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), reduction of exchange rate volatility in the later 
years of our sample.  To the extent that price dispersion was driven by any of the above 
factors, we would expect to see accelerated convergence to the LOOP. Moreover, by relating 
price dispersion (or the reduction thereof) to the timing of institutional changes, we hope to 
highlight the factors primarily responsible for deviations from the LOOP. 
Our approach to the above questions deviates from the traditional convergence literature 
in that it is a distinctly micro approach.  We focus on a particular market, the European 
automobile market, and exploit a large panel data set that we have put together ourselves 
over several years, containing observations on car prices and characteristics in five countries 
over the period 1970-2000.  We believe that this approach offers three main advantages. 
First, the European car market has  been a  notorious example of deviations from  the 
LOOP in international markets.  The persistent and exceedingly large cross-country  price 
differences, for virtually identical products, have been the focus of intense public debate in 
Europe.  The European Commission has considered the European auto market a test case 
for integration and ordered several investigations into the sources of these price differences. 
Furthermore, it has taken concrete steps to integrate the national markets and reduce price 
dispersion.  Hence,  the car market is  a natural starting point in an investigation of the 
relationship between market integration and convergence. 
Second, while recent studies seem to "converge"  in their findings on PPP, the evidence 
pertains primarily to the relative versions of LOOP or PPP.  .Ai;  pointed out in Goldberg 
and Knetter (1997), and Knetter and Slaughter (2001), this preoccupation with the relative 
versions reflects data realities rather than research interests - typically, the data employed in 
price comparisons are fairly aggregate price data or price indices (Parsley and Wei's use of 
disaggregate product level data from ACCRA, and Haskel and Wolf's (2001) product level 
data from IKEA stores are notable exceptions).  In general, disaggregate data are easier to 
obtain for national markets, which is one of the reasons that studies of the absolute version of 
the LOOP tend to focus on a single country.  Disaggregate price data for multiple countries 
need to be assembled individually,  on a  product-by-product basis from national industry 
3 journals written in many different languages.l  Even when disaggregate data are available, it 
is rarely the case that the identical goods  assumption needed for the absolute version of the 
LOOP holds.  Yet,  there is little doubt that absolute price differences can be indicative of 
market segmentation; few of us, for example, would characterize Europe as an ''integrated'' 
market if there were a constant $3,000 difference in the price of a Toyota Corrolla across 
Belgium and Germany.  One of the strengths of our data set - and this is why we had to 
collect the data ourselves - is  that the detail of the information  (prices of individual car 
models  plus characteristics)  allows  us to compare prices of homogeneous products across 
countries, and hence test not only the relative, but also the absolute version of the LOOP. 
Finally, our focus  on a particular market allows us a more in-depth analysis of the in-
stitutional details.  It is the institutional analysis that helps us understand the sources of 
market segmentation and relate particular measures aimed at integration to actual price 
convergence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we provide a brief 
overview of the sources of segmentation in the European car market and discuss the steps 
that have been taken in the last two decades to promote integration. We use this institutional 
analysis as a basis for forming the hypotheses concerning price convergence that we examine 
in Section 4.  Section 3 discusses  the data.  Section 4 considers various specifications of 
convergence equations, and reports our findings.  To summarize our results, we find strong 
evidence in favor  of convergence towards  both the absolute and the relative versions of 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).  To our knowledge,  this is  the first study documenting 
convergence towards the absolute version of the Law of One Price in international markets.  2 
1 Haskel and Wolf (2001)  are the only other study to our knowledge that undertook such a  task;  the 
authors assembled data for  several products sold by IKEA in various countries.  The focus of their study is 
however more on price comparisons across countries in any given year, rather than on the dynamic issue of 
price convergence addressed in our paper. This is partly dictated by the nature of our data sets; Holger and 
Wolf have data for 29 countries but only 4 years, while we have data for 5 countries but 30 years. 
2The closest  analog to our study for  domestic  markets is  Parsley and Wei  (1996).  Their work  also 
documents convergence to the absolute version of LOOP, but in a setting without trade barriers or currency 
fluctuations. 
4 In comparison to previous studies our estimated speed of convergence seems surprisingly 
high - the implied half-life of a shock is,  depending on the specification, between 1.3 and 
1.6  years when we test the relative version, and between 5 and 8.3 years when we test the 
absolute version of LOOP. Moreover, we find equally high speeds of convergence when we run 
the regressions country-by-country, thus giving up the cross-sectional dimension of our panel 
data.  This contrasts with the widely held view in the literature that it was the transition 
from time-series to panel data that allowed researchers to find support for the convergence 
hypothesis. Finally, our results also seem to contrast with the findings of an earlier paper by 
Gagnon and Knetter (1995) that focuses on the same market (automobiles), but uses data 
from a  different set of countries,  and finds  strong evidence against the relative version of 
the LOOP. We should emphasize that we  do not view our results as constituting evidence 
in favor of the universal validity of the LOOP; rather, we attribute the surprisingly strong 
evidence in support of the convergence hypothesis found in our data to the progress towards 
integration in the European market. 
2  Segmentation, Price Dispersion, and Integration in 
the European Car Market 
When thinking about cross-country price dispersion, it is useful to distinguish conceptually 
between two conditions that are required for the existence of price differences.  First, price 
differences require market segmentation.  Second, conditional on markets being segmented, 
we need firms to have reasons to take advantage of this segmentation.  Such reasons would 
include cost differences across markets, or differences in the price elasticities of demand, in 
which case the price differences  are indicative of price discrimination.  With this concep-
tual framework in mind, we now discuss the institutions that generate segmentation in the 
European car market and the factors that account for the price differences. 
5 2.1  The sources of market segmentation 
Since the removal of tariff barriers in 1968, segmentation in the European auto market has 
been driven by three distinct factors:  the differing national systems of type approval, the 
distribution system, and the requirement of national registration.  These factors add to the 
transportation costs, information costs and language barriers that are also present in many 
other European industries. 
The differing national systems of  type approval formed until recently a first major imped-
iment to consumers seeking to purchase a car abroad. Each European country had typically 
its own set of vehicle requirements.  Costly modifications of the imported vehicle were often 
needed. Moreover, in most countries the job of checking and certifying the conformity of an 
imported car was entrusted to the official importers. There is no doubt that this procedure 
enabled them to control and monitor the cross-country trade in the cars they were selling. 
The granting of a certificate often took several weeks, involved costly trips, and required fees 
that bore no relationship to the services provided.3 
A second major obstacle to cross-border trade stems from the distribution system. During 
the 1970s and early 1980s many suppliers instructed their dealers (threatening to withdraw 
their concessions)  not to sell to unauthorized resellers,  in particular if the purchase was 
intended for  export.  Discrimination against resellers also occurred in more subtle forms: 
excessive delivery lags, high deposit requirements, and higher prices (see BEUe, 1981 and 
1982). In addition, it was a regular practice not to carry out after-sales services on imported 
cars,  even if these services  would normally fall  under the guarantee period.  Regulation 
123/85 subsequently institutionalized several of these practices as a block exemption to the 
European competition rules.  This regulation was initially approved for 1985-95,  but was 
renewed for  another 7 years  in 1995.  It effectively introduced a system of selective and 
exclusive distribution, specifying in detail the potentially restrictive arrangements that are 
3For example, the general importer of General Motors in Belgium WlIS convicted in 1975 for demanding 
excessive fees  with the evident intention to discourage paraIlel imports.  BEUC  (1982)  reports that one 
importer even charged the difference between the two countries' local prices as a fee for issuing the type-
approval certificate. 
6 legally permitted in agreements between car suppliers and their dealers.4  Selectivity means 
that the manufacturer can choose his/her dealers and restrain them from reselling to anyone 
but end-users or approved sellers.  Exclusiveness refers to the right of being the single seller 
in a designated territory, implying restrictions to engage in active sales promotion outside 
the territory (or country). In theory, the system protected the right of end-users to purchase 
their cars  abroad.  For  example,  it guaranteed after-sales  services  during the guarantee 
period, irrespective of where the car was purchased.  Nevertheless, many difficulties were still 
encountered. An anonymous dealer survey by BEUC (1986) reported no after-sales problems, 
but it revealed a refusal to sell to foreign consumers in 20% of the cases; excessive delivery lags 
for right hand drive cars for the U.K.; and lower discounts to foreigners.  These problems need 
to be added to the high transportation and information costs for  unexperienced consumers 
seeking to purchase abroad.  Furthermore,  Regulation 123/85 formally erected obstacles 
against independent commercial importers who attempted to purchase cars in bulk.  These 
were only allowed to act as intermediaries, with a written purchase authorization from their 
customers.  Though the Regulation stated that the European Commission could withdraw 
the benefits of the Regulation in some instances, for example if  price differences between two 
member states (excluding the high tax countries Danmark and Greece) exceeded 12% over 
a period of 6 months, or 18% at any point in time, in practice these threats have never been 
enforced. 
A third obstacle to trade between countries has been caused by the system of national 
registration, which had the effect of limiting trade of foreign, mainly Japanese models.  Quan-
titative restrictions on imports from third countries, in particular Japan, have long existed in 
various European countries (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the U.K.).  These restrictions 
take the form of import quotas or voluntary export restraints.  The problem is,  of course, 
that parallel imports from other European countries can undo the national restrictions.  The 
requirement of national registration resolves this problem, since it can control cross-border 
trade of Japanese cars.  In Italy, for example, there existed a tight quota of 3300 cars that 
4The regulation was explicitly motivated on the grounds that cars are durable goods, and as such need 
high quality after-sales service through an official distribution network. 
7 could be directly imported from Japan.  The total number of Japanese cars that could be 
officially registered in Italy, including cars from other European countries, was limited to 
23000  (slightly more than oUe  percent of the Italian market).  When the national quotas 
were replaced in 1993 by a common import quota for the European Union as a whole, the 
requirement of national registration continued to maintain unofficial national quotas under 
various pretexts. 
Any remaining doubts about the degree of segmentation in European markets can be dis-
pelled by looking at the magnitude of parallel imports, the goods imported by unauthorized 
resellers.  Table 1 summarizes the evidence collected from various BEUC surveys.5It reveals 
that parallel imports have been quite low in all European countries.  They generally do not 
constitute more than three percent of the total market, and in many countries and years less 
than one percent. These small numbers are even more remarkable, when one considers that 
the average price difference between the cheapest and the most expensive European country 
has been around 30% of the car price. 
Given that markets are segmented, it is clear that firms  can charge different prices in 
European countries.  But why should they want to?  Providing an answer to this question 
is  important as it allows  us to understand why barriers to arbitrage were erected in the 
first place.  Given that segmentation does not rest on  ''natural'' barriers, but is the result 
of regulations that reflect firms'  lobbying efforts, understanding the incentives of firms to 
charge different prices in different markets is equivalent to understanding the incentives for 
preventing arbitrage across markets.  This question is investigated in detail in Goldberg and 
Verboven (forthcoming).  In the context of a structural model of the European auto market 
they identify three main sources of price dispersion in Europe:  cross-country differences in 
costs, differences in the price elasticities of demand generating differences in markups, and 
import quota constraints. The first source (costs) seems particularly relevant for explaining 
the high prices in the U.K. and Germany (in Germany, for example, environmental regula-
5No official statistics on parallel imports are available, so the numbers should be viewed as rough esti-
mates. The BEUC gathered the information from various sources, i.e., from national automobile associations 
(Belgium, France, Italy), a parallel importers' trade association (Germany), and a parallel importer (U.K.). 
8 tions prescribe the use of a catalyzator that is associated with higher production cost); the 
second source (price elasticities of demand) explains the relatively high prices in Italy, where 
a strong preference for domestic brands generates market power for the domestic firm (Fiat); 
quota constraints are relevant explanations for Italy, France and the U.K..  In addition, the 
authors document local currency price stability that generates large variation in year-to-year 
price differentials.  This stability is attributed partially to markup adjustment that is corre-
lated with exchange rate volatility, but primarily to the presence of a large local component 
in marginal costs. In particular, our estimates imply that around 35% of marginal costs are 
local costs, such as distribution costs.  The importance of local distribution costs is consis-
tent with industry sources, and also with the recent findings of Burstein, Neves and Rebelo 
(2001) who report that local distribution costs represent more than 40% of the retail price 
in US industries (and more than 60% in Argentina). 
2.2  The integration process 
Against this background we can think of the integration process in the European car market 
as having two goals:  first, diminish the degree of segmentation, and, second, directly reduce 
price differences by eliminating sources of cost differences and discouraging price discrimi-
nation.  An important measure towards reducing segmentation has been the harmonization 
of so-called  "essential requirements"  for  new car models throughout the European Union. 
A list of such requirements was set out as early as 1970; yet the process of actually imple-
menting specific changes has been very slow and gradual.  For a long time countries had 
the option of allowing their national type approval standards to co-exist with the European 
directives.  Most countries made use of this option.  By 1987,  only Italy had adopted the 
European directives as the single local standard.  The harmonized type approval directives 
eventually became mandatory, and fully replaced the national systems in 1995.  To the extent 
that these differing national requirements have been responsible for  cost differences across 
countries we would expect cross-country price differentials to decline in absolute terms as a 
result of integration.  To the extent that national regulations have been used as  an excuse 
to prevent arbitrage, we would expect the integration process to have sped up convergence. 
9 At any rate, we would expect these changes to show up only gradually given how slow the 
harmonization process was. 
A second step towards integration was the relaxation of the exclusivity of the distribution 
system when Regulation 123/85 was renewed in 1995; dealers can now advertize outside their 
territory and carry competing brands.  At the same time, there has also been some effort to 
prevent auto dealers from abusing the selectivity of the distribution system.  For example, 
the explicit condition was added that manufacturers should not restrict consumers, or inter-
mediaries acting on their behalf,  to purchase from any dealer.  In addition, the European 
Commission has been carefully monitoring price differences since 1992,  and has explicitly 
stated its preparedness to withdraw the benefits of the selective distribution system if  price 
differences across states exceed 12%  (this is  the so-called 12% rule).  The recent Volkswa-
gen case  (1998)  has also indicated the Commission's intention to get more serious about 
preventing dealers from abusing their privileges. Volkswagen was accused and convicted for 
putting pressure on Italian dealers not to sell to German and Italian customers.  This pres-
sure involved threats to 50 dealers to withdraw their licenses, and 12 licenses were effectively 
withdrawn.  The penalties included a  102  million ECU fine  (about 10%  of Volkswagen's 
annual profit), the largest fine ever issued by the European Commission to a single firm, and 
the removal of Volkswagen's rights as set out in the Regulation.  Similar investigations are 
under way against Opel and Mercedes.  These investigations and penalties should have the 
effect of encouraging arbitrage across markets - in fact, parallel imports have been increasing 
in recent years - and increasing the speed of convergence. In addition, one would also expect 
manufacturers to be more hesitant to exercise price discrimination - at a  minimum, they 
might try to keep price differences below the 12% benchmark.  As a result, we would expect 
to see lower price differentials across countries - in absolute terms. 
Further measures towards integration include tax harmonization and the recent transition 
to the EMU (1998).  As Table 1 indicates, tax rate differences are now smaller compared 
to their levels in the past; the diminishing of tax differences should reduce absolute price 
differentials.  To the extent that price differentials reflect local currency price stability,  the 
transition to a system of fixed exchange rates should substantially reduce the year-to-year 
10 variation in price differentials.  While the transition to the EMU is too recent for us to be 
able to detect its effects on prices, the fact that Belgium, France and Germany have had a 
system of  quasi-fixed rates in the 1980's and 1990's, allows us to indirectly test the hypothesis 
that a reduction of nominal exchange rate volatility translates to faster convergence to the 
LOOP. 
In summary, in light of the recent developments in the European markets, one wonders 
whether absolute price differentials have been reduced and whether the speed of price con-
vergence for the countries in our sample has increased.  Nevertheless, the above discussion 
also suggests that impediments to arbitrage still exist, and that exchange rate volatility is an 
issue throughout our sample period, especially for the U.K..  Given this, we start by asking 
the basic question, whether the LOOP holds in our data. 
3  A  First Look at the Data 
The data set we have constructed to examine price convergence is a large three dimensional 
panel, containing information on approximately 150 vehicle makes per year in five  distinct 
European markets over the period 1970-2000.  For each make we have information on sales, 
list price, and physical characteristics such as engine attributes, dimensions, and performance 
variables; these characteristics sometimes vary across markets. The five markets included in 
our analysis are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.  We focus our 
attention on these five  countries, both because of data availability constraints, and, more 
importantly, because they represent the largest markets in Europe: collectively they account 
for over 85% of total car sales in Europe every year. In addition, these countries represent a 
large spectrum for several reasons:  the size of the market varies from ca.  400,000 units per 
year in Belgium to almost 3 million cars in Germany; the degree of import penetration ranges 
from ca. 30% in France and Germany to almost 100% in Belgium; the Japanese penetration 
varies from ca. 1% in Italy to 20% in Belgium; tax rates vary from 14% in Germany to 33% 
in France in the early years, and 25% later; and the Cl-concentration index ranges from 53% 
in Italy to 16% in Belgium; throughout our sample period Belgium tends to be the cheapest 
11 destination, while the U.K. is associated with the highest prices. 
Because our information is at the vehicle make level, our cross-country price comparisons 
refer to relatively homogeneous products (for example, we are comparing the price of a Honda 
Civic in Belgium to the price of a Honda Civic in Germany). Nevertheless, to be absolutely 
sure that we  are comparing identical products, we use hedonic price regressions to control 
for  possible variation in characteristics or options of models across countries, and use  the 
residuals of these regressions as the relevant prices in our price convergence regressions. 
Even after controlling for observable differences of narrowly defined products across coun-
tries (such as engine or performance differences), one could argue that products sold in differ-
ent markets are not entirely homogeneous.  The homogeneity assumption could, for example, 
be violated in our case because of unobserved product characteristics that may differ across 
markets, the existence of different discount practices in different countries, or transportation 
costs (though the magnitude of the price differentials in individual years makes it unlikely 
that any of these factors could by itself explain the documented price dispersion).  To the 
extent that the relative importance of these factors in explaining price dispersion did not 
change much during our sample period6,  our results on relative price convergence will be 
unaffected.  However, violations of the homogeneity assumption would make us more likely 
to reject the hypothesis of convergence to the absolute version of the LOOP.  In this sense, 
the fact that we do find  convergence towards the absolute version of the LOOP - despite 
6With respect to discounts, in particular, our sources indicate that they did not change much over our 
sample period.  The BEUC (1992) provides a comparison between the 1989 and 1992 maximum discounts, 
and reports the following changes between the two years:  Belgium:  from 11% to 10%; France:  8% in both 
years;  Germany:  from  10% to 8%;  U.K.  from  15 to 11%;  Italy:  not available.  Degryse and Verboven 
(2000) find similar small variations in the gross dealer margins (at the brand level), based on questionnaires 
mandated by the European Commission.  Gross dealer margins are a measure of the maximum discounts 
and financial benefits a dealer can offer to consumers.  They changed as follows  between 1993 and 1999:  in 
Belgium (country average) from 17% to 15%; in France from 17% to 15%; in Germany from 19% to 17%; in 
Italy from 18% to 16% and in the U.K. from 17% to 13%.  These differences in discounts across countries 
are too sma11 in comparison to the price differentials to explain the price dispersion in any given year, and 
the changes over time (and especially the cross-country differences in these changes) are too sma11 to explain 
price convergence. 
12 potential violations of the homogeneity assumption - makes the case for the validity of the 
LOOP even stronger, and our estimate of the speed of convergence provides a lower bound 
of the true rate of convergence. 
To obtain a preliminary idea about price dispersion and convergence in our data, it is 
useful to look at some graphs based on more aggregate data first.  To construct aggregate 
price indices, we ran the following hedonic price regression: 
The subscripts i, k and t refer to product i, country k and year t respectively. The variable 
rpi,k,t refers to the raw, pre-tax price of car model i expressed in a common currency (Euro). 
The vector Wi,k,t consists of physical car characteristics that may vary across markets, while 
(}e  and (}f  are market segment  and firm dummies respectively.  In addition, we  include a 
set of source country/time dummies  ((}s,t)  to control for  differences that may be due to a 
common cost shock facing firms located in a particular country of origin (e.g.  an increase in 
wages facing all Japanese firms).  Given this specification, the destination/time effects (}k,t 
capture the residual cross-country price differences that cannot be explained by differences in 
quality or taxation across markets. All differences are measured in percentage terms relative 
to Belgium.7 
Figure 1 plots the estimated price indices  (}k,t  for  the period 1970-2000.  The figure 
documents the same patterns reported in Goldberg and Verboven (forthcoming) for a sub-
period of this sample:  (1)  large and persistent cross-country price differentials;  and (2) 
substantial year-to-year volatility.  Belgium appears to be the cheapest country throughout 
the sample period, while the U.K. is - in most  years - the most expensive.  These patterns 
were robust to alternative specifications of the hedonic equation.  Moreover, they were robust 
to the use of more disaggregate price indices.  For example,  using a similar hedonic price 
framework  as  the one described above,  we estimated and plotted price  indices  for  each 
market segment separately (small, large, luxury, sports cars, etc.).  The graphs exhibited 
7 All coefficients in the hedonic price regression had the expected signs and were precisely estimated. The 
R2  of the regression WlIB 0.97.  The full set of results is available from the authors upon request. 
13 approximately the same magnitude and same volatility of price dispersion, indicating that 
the patterns evident in Figure 1 are not driven by aggregation. 
Looking at Figure 1,  one would be hard-pressed to claim price convergence.  What is 
perhaps most surprising is that, while prices seem to be coming together around 1990-92, 
they start diverging again after 1992, a development that certainly runs against the idea of 
the integrated "Europe 1992".  A closer examination of the graph reveals that it is the prices 
in the U.K. and Italy that diverge the most. These two countries however experienced large 
currency fluctuations in the 1990's that may have affected price convergence.  More generally, 
the price volatility exhibited in Figure 1 immediately brings exchange rates to mind, as there 
is no other source of price dispersion as volatile as nominal exchange rates.  Figure 2 plots 
the exchange rates of the countries in our sample vis a vis Belgium; the correlation between 
the evolution of price differences in Figure 1 and the exchange rate fluctuations in Figure 2 
is immediately apparent. 
Since the existence of price convergence over our sample period does  not seem to be 
an issue that can be settled through graphs or simple statistics,  we  now turn to a more 
systematic investigation of price convergence. 
4  Results on Price Convergence 
This section investigates different versions of price convergence.  We start by documenting 
the persistence of long term price differentials and providing an estimate of the speed of con-
vergence, i.e.  how fast deviations from the long-term price differentials are eliminated. Next, 
we investigate the effects of the integration process; in particular, we examine whether long 
term price differentials have decreased over time, and whether the speed of convergence has 
increased.  In specifying the dependent variable we face two choices:  Define the dependent 
variable as !:l.qi,k,t  where q denotes the log- price level of product i  in country k  at time t; 
or, alternatively, choose a benchmark country, and define the dependent variable as !:l.Pi,k,t 
where P refers to the log-difference in the price of product i  in country k  relative to the 
benchmark country. We chose the second approach with Belgium as the numeraire country. 
14 Belgium provides a natural benchmark as it is both the country with the lowest car prices in 
Europe, and thz market with the fewest trade restrictions and lowest concentration. In the 
context of arbitrage, we find it more appealing to focus on bilateral price differences relative 
to the cheapest country, rather than on deviations from a theoretical cross-country average. 
A possible criticism of this approach is that the convergence results are not invariant to the 
choice of the numeraire country (see Papell (1997), Wei and Parsley (1995), Cecchetti et al 
(2000)).  To address this criticism we also estimated convergence equations using different 
countries as the benchmark (e.g., Germany), and also using the log-price level as the depen-
dent variable.8  In both cases our results were very similar to the ones reported below, so 
that we  are confident that our conclusions are not due to the particular choice of the base 
country. 
Because some of the vehicle makes are not available for  all 31 years in our sample, our 
panel is unbalanced. For example, several Japanese and Korean models were only introduced 
in the late seventies.  Other models stopped being produced (this usually happened if the 
firm owned another successful model in the same segment).  To deal with this issue we 
used the following procedure:  First, we run hedonic price regressions to control for quality, 
and firm reputation differences across markets.  These regressions also include interactions 
of market segment/country of origin/destination market/time dummies on the right hand 
side.  The coefficients of these dummies represent representative quality-adjusted averages of 
individual vehicle make prices during each year, by market segment, country of origin and 
destination country.  We  use these quality adjusted prices to form the dependent variable 
used in the estimation. 
4.1  The basic convergence equation 
We start by estimating the following basic version of the convergence equation: 
BIn thls case we include time effects on the right hand side of the convergence equations.  Convergence in 
this case is understood as convergence to an average across the countries in our sample. 
15 L 
flPi,k,t = ai,k +  (3Pi,k,t-l + L 'Ylflpi,k,t-l +  Ci,k,t 
1=1 
(1) 
Our estimation procedure is based on the work of Levin and Lin (1992) on unit root tests 
with panel data. AB noted above, the dependent variable is the log-difference in the price of 
product i in country k relative to Belgium. The main parameter of interest is (3 that denotes 
the speed of convergence.  Under the null of no convergence,  (3  is equal to zero.  In this 
case a shock to Pi,k,t is permanent. Convergence implies a negative (3, with the approximate 
half-life of a shock to Pi,k,t given by -In(2)/  In(l + (3).  Cecchetti et al (2000)  also consider 
an alternative specification (based on work by 1m et al (1997)), in which the coefficient (3 is 
allowed to vary across countries ((3  is replaced by (3k  in this case); convergence here implies 
a negative (3 for some countries ((3k < 0, for some k), as opposed to all countries as in Levin 
and Lin.  We chose the Levin and Lin approach as it is the more conservative one - it is 
unlikely that the behavior of only one or two countries will lead us to reject the unit root 
hypothesis in this case.  We do consider country-specific (3's however, later in subsection 4.3, 
in which we estimate a separate convergence equation for each country pair in our sample. 
The dummies ai,k capture product/country fixed effects that account for non-time depen-
dent, product specific price differences across countries.  Such effects could be transportation 
costs (measured as percentages of price differences), unobserved quality differences that vary 
by destination, or markup differences.  The presence of the product/country fixed effects in 
the estimation indicates that we  are testing the relative version of the LOOP. In addition 
to the speed of convergence (3,  we  are also interested in examining the absolute values of 
the ai,k's; large values of these product/country specific effects would indicate market seg-
mentation, even if  the relative version of the LOOP held in the data. The lags  flPi,k,t-1  are 
used to account for possible serial correlation in the error term.9  AB a robustness test on our 
9The number of lags is  determined using Campbell and Perron's (1991) top-down approach.  We start 
by setting L  =  5;  if  the absolute value of the t-statistic for  1'6  is less than 1.96 then we reset L  =  4 and 
reestimate the equation. We repeat this procedure until the t-statistic of the coefficient with the longest lag 
is greater than 1.96. 
16 results, we also estimated unpooled regressions by product, and the results were similar. We 
therefore only report result£; from the pooled regressions here. 
Table 2, column 1, reports the estimation results for equation (1).  The coefficient estimate 
for /3 is -0.41, with a t-statistic of -24. Note that in the pooled estimation we have 30 years 
of data, and appro:ximately 240  product and country specific dummies.  The critical values 
reported in Levin and Lin (1992) for t =  25 and N  =  250 (appro:ximately our panel size) are 
-21.98, -21.43 and -21.13 at the 1%,  5%,  and 10% respectively.  Based on these critical 
values we can reject the null of a unit root (or no convergence).  This result contrasts with 
the findings of Parsley and Wei (1996) or Frankel and Rose (1995) who find it hard to reject 
the unit root hypothesis when fixed effects are allowed in the panel framework.  It is also 
remarkable that the implied half life  of a  shock is  according to our estimates 1.3  years. 
This is a much shorter interval than what is traditionally estimated with international data 
(5 to 6 years);  interestingly enough, it corresponds roughly to Parsley and Wei's estimate 
for tradeable goods in the United States, a market that we  would normally consider more 
integrated than Europe.lO  Note,  however, that Parsley and Wei's basic specification does 
not include destination specific fixed  effects,  while ours does.  As  mentioned above,  such 
fixed effects may themselves be indicative of market segmentation.  We therefore turn our 
attention to our estimates of the fixed effects next. 
The product/country specific dummies are jointly significant at the 5%  level.  Rather 
than reporting the individual product/country fixed  effects,  Table 2 displays the country 
average fixed effects  (i.e.  the averages of the a.,k across products by country),  and the 
corresponding standard errors.  By dividing these fixed effects by -/3,  we obtain the long-
term, systematic price differentials across countries.  The long-term price differentials take 
values between 5% (France) and 17% (U.K.) and are all highly significant. They indicate the 
presence of persistent price differences relative to Belgium - the U.K. estimate, for example, 
implies that during our sample period, U.K. quality adjusted prices are approximately 17% 
higher than in Belgium.  Price differences of this magnitude seem at odds with the common 
wisdom view of market integration - despite the fact that the unit root hypothesis is rejected 
lOFor services, Parsley and Wey find lower convergence rates, with a median of about 4 years. 
17 in the data.  Comparing our results with the analogous findings of Parsley and Wei for the 
U.S., it seems that the big difference between Europe and the U.S.  lies in the fixed effects. 
While our estimates of the speed of convergence are very similar, the fixed effects are high 
and statistically significant in Europe, which is probably not the case in the U.S .. 
The histogram of Figure 3 provides a more detailed description of the product/country 
fixed  effects.  Here the product/country dummies are averaged by market segment.  Each 
bar in the histogram represents the percent price difference of the corresponding market 
segment in the country of interest  relative to Belgium.  Note that the pattern of price 
differences seems relatively robust to different market segments.  The only exception is the 
luxury market segment in Germany which represents the only product group with prices 
lower than in Belgium. 
Columns 3 and 5 of Table 2 also report results based on regressions in which (  a) Germany 
is used as the base country; and (b)  there is no numeraire country, but the comparison of 
price differences is relative to a cross-country average (the specification includes time effects 
in this case).  The basic message of columns 3 and 5 that our conclusions are not sensitive 
to the choice of the base country; the estimates of the convergence speed are very similar in 
both cases to the ones obtained with Belgium as the base country. 
4.2  The role of exchange rate changes 
The literature on the relative version  of PPP has suggested that nominal exchange rate 
volatility in conjunction with short-term price rigidities may be important in explaining 
international price differences.  To  investigate the role of exchange rate changes,  we  also 
estimated the following equation: 
L  M 
b.Pi,k,t =  C¥i,k +  /3Pi,k,t-1 + L 'Ylb.Pi,k,t-1 + L omb.ek,t-m +  Ci,k,t  (2) 
1=1  m=O 
The variable ek,t denotes the log of the exchange rate of country k's currency relative to 
the Belgian Franc. The lag structure of exchange rate changes is included to capture changes 
in cross-country price differentials that may result from short-term nominal rigidities. Figure 
2 that plots the exchange rates of the four countries in our sample relative to Belgium suggests 
18 that this may be an important issue.  For example,  the decline  in the price differential 
between the U.K. and Belgium in the petiod 1990-92 coincides with the depreciation of the 
pound. Without controlling for this depreciation we might be attributing this apparent ''price 
convergence" to institutional changes aimed at fostering integration, when the true source of 
the change might in fact be just fortuitous movement of exchange rates in the right direction. 
And vice versa, there might be periods where, despite efforts to increase integration, we may 
observe a widening of price differentials because of exchange rate changes that are not passed 
though onto local currency prices in the short run. 
The results for the specification that includes exchange rate changes are displayed in Table 
2, column 2.  In the reported specification we included the exchange rate change and its first 
three lags to capture pass-through effects that may spread over several years.  All variables 
appearing in equation (2)  are stationary - prices by virtue of the results in the previous 
subsection, while for exchange rate changes we established stationarity separately.  There are 
two things to note in Specification 2.  First, our estimate of the speed of convergence hardly 
changes compared to the specification without exchange rates; the point estimate is -0.38 (t-
statistic: -23.3) implying a half-life of a shock of approximately 1.5 years.  Nevertheless, the 
exchange rate change and its first two lags are highly significant.  AB expected, all coefficients 
are negative, and declining in absolute value as the lags get longer.  The magnitude of  ~ek.t is 
striking (point estimate:  -0.76,  with a t-statistic of -32).  It implies that only 24%  of an 
exchange rate change gets passed through (on average) onto local prices in the short run. 
This is consistent with previous work on exchange rate pass-through that has documented 
local currency price inertia. Note, however, that the coefficient on the first lag is substantially 
smaller in absolute value (0.14).  The robustness ofthe estimated speed of convergence to the 
inclusion of exchange rate changes suggests that, while exchange rate changes and nominal 
rigidities are important in the short run in explaining cross-country price differentials, our 
finding of fast relative price convergence is not due just to movements of exchange rates in 
the right direction. 
Of course, a natural objection to the above statement is that two of the countries in our 
sample (France and Germany) had quasi-fixed exchange rates relative to Belgium for most of 
19 our sample period. To investigate whether these quasi-fixed exchange rates may have had an 
impact on our results, we next turn to bilateral regressions examining the price differentials 
in each of the countries in our sample relative to Belgium. 
4.3  Country pairs 
Table 3  reports the convergence coefficients  (standard errors in parentheses) obtained by 
estimating convergence equations for each country pair separately. The first row of numbers 
was obtained using Belgium as the base country, the second row using France, and so on. 
The striking feature of this table is that the estimated speeds of convergence are very high for 
virtually all countries in our sample. While there is some variation in the point estimates of  f3 
(it ranges from -0.35 for the Italy/Belgium pair to -0.60 for Germany  /France), the coefficient 
is always statistically significant, and implies relatively short half-lives of price shocks (from 
0.75 to 1.6 years).ll  Note that by estimating bilateral regressions, we give up the country 
dimension in our panel data set - we only exploit the time variation in price differences.  In 
light of this, our results are remarkable.  Most previous work on price convergence failed 
to reject the null of a unit root in the price series when time series data were used.  The 
recent findings on relative price convergence are often attributed to the use of panel data sets 
which allow the econometrician to exploit the cross-sectional dimension.  This explanation, 
however, does not seem to apply to our case.  Of course, we do exploit a richer than usual 
data set, in the sense that we have detailed data on multiple models. 
The results in Table 3 were obtained using a specification that did not include exchange 
rate changes. Including exchange rate changes leaves the f3  coefficients virtually unchanged; 
as before,  the coefficients on the exchange rate changes are highly significant.  A notable 
pattern concerning the exchange rate coefficients is that these are substantially higher in 
absolute value in regressions in which the U.K. is compared to an other base country.  For 
llNote that the relevant critical values for this specification are the ones corresponding to t=25 and N=50, 
where N here denotes the number of products. These critical values are -10.89, -10.35 and -10.06 at the 1%, 
5%  and 10% significance levels  respectively  (Levin and Lin  (1992),  Table 5).  All the t-statistics of the 
estimated {3's in Table 3 are less than -11. 
20 example, in the U.K./Belgium regression, the coefficient on ~ek.t, where e here denotes the 
exchange rate between the Belgian Franc and the British Pound, is 0.81  (standard error: 
0.04), while the exchange rate coefficients for the other countries range between -0.42  and 
-0.69.  This suggests that nominal exchange rate volatility is more important in explaining 
price differences in the U.K.,  relative to the other countries in our sample.  This is  not 
surprising given that two out of the three remaining countries in our sample had a system 
of quasi-fixed exchange rates. 
4.4  Progress towards integration? 
The previous results established (i)  the persistence of long-term price differentials across 
countries, and (ii) a relatively fast convergence to the long-run equilibrium after price shocks 
(half-lives of approximately 1.5 years).  Our next question concerns the role of the integration 
process.  Our panel data set, that spans a period of 30 years, is ideal for  addressing this 
question.  All  discussed in Section 2, the European Commission has taken several measures 
over the past three decades to improve European integration.  Since most of these measures 
have been implemented gradually,  we found it most appropriate to use trend variables to 
capture their effect. We interpret these trend variables as applying only to our sample period: 
1970-2000. To make sure that we are capturing the real effects of  integration, rather than any 
nominal shocks, we include exchange rate changes in our specification, as we did previously 
in equation (2). 
Our primary hypothesis is that, to the extent that integration measures have had an effect, 
the absolute price differentials (the fixed effects) should have declined.  To investigate this 
hypothesis, we interact the product/country fixed effects with time trends. A second question 
is whether the speed of convergence has changed over time.  All else being equal, one would 
expect integration to speed up price convergence: shocks to prices should be eliminated faster 
if  consumers or intermediaries can more easily engage in arbitrage.  However, this expected 
increase in the speed of convergence may not occur if  the absolute price differentials have 
declined as a result of integration. This is because of the commonly observed non-linearities in 
the speed of price convergence: large shocks and large price differences tend to be eliminated 
21 faster than small differences.  IT integration reduces price differences across countries, then 
price shocks may be eliminated more slowly, not because impediments to arbitrage have not 
diminished, but because the price differences to be eliminated are smaller compared to the 
pre-integration period.  To capture the effect of integration on the speed of convergence we 
interact the convergence coefficient with a time trend. 
Table 4 reports the results.  Column 1 considers the effect of integration on the absolute 
price differentials.  The underlying equation is: 
L  M 
I1p.,k,t =  a',k + ak *  trend + (JP',k,t-1 + L  'Y/I1P.,k,t-1 + L Oml1ek,t-m + Ci,k,t  (3) 
1=1  m=O 
We focus on a specification where only the country average fixed effects ak are interacted 
with a trend, so that our trend coefficient captures the effect of integration on avemge price 
differentials in each market relative to Belgium.  It is important to note here that we use 
the trend only to capture gradual integration during our sample period (see the institutional 
discussion in Section 2), and not long-run growth out of sample.  The estimated coefficients 
indicate that the average price levels in France, the United Kingdom and especially in Italy 
have declined significantly relative to Belgium.  The annual declines range from 0.7 percent 
(France) to 1.5 percent (Italy). In contrast, the average price level in Germany has increased 
(moderately) relative to Belgium.  Yet the country fixed effects show that Germany had a 
lower price level than France, Italy and the United Kingdom at the beginning of the sample. 
The change of the fixed effect  for  Germany thus shows convergence of the German price 
level to the price levels in the other countries.  Overall, these country averages indicate a 
gradual increase in integration. Nevertheless, it is possible that, while the country averages 
demonstrate a trend towards price convergence, prices at the product level are still dispersed. 
To examine this possibility, we tested whether the deviations of the country/product fixed 
effects from the average country fixed  effects were  significant.  Only 22  percent  of these 
deviations were significant at the 5% level.  Most of the deviations fell within the -3% + 3% 
range. 
Column 2 of Table 4 considers the effect of integration on the speed of convergence.  The 
22 underlying equation here is: 
L  M 
!:J.Pi,k,t = ai,k + ak *  trend +  {3 *  Pi,k,t-1 +  jJ *  trend *  Pi,k,t-1 + L II!:J.Pi,k,t-1 + L Omi1ek,t-m +  Ci,k,t 
1=1  m=O 
(4) 
It  turns out that integration has had little effect on the speed of convergence; if anything, 
the speed of  convergence has decreased (the decrease is significant at thelO% level).  This may 
follow from the presence of non-linearities discussed above. H there is a "band of inaction" , as 
suggested by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), then arbitrage will only occur when deviations from 
the LOOP are sufficiently large, so that small price differences will be eliminated slower than 
big differences.  Asplund and Friberg's (2001) recent findings on the speed of convergence in 
products sold in duty-free shops provide strong support for this argument. 
In sum,  we  conclude that integration has led to a  gradual reduction in the average 
price differentials during 1970-2000, yet the speed of convergence in response to shocks has 
remained more or less unaffected.  This is perhaps not surprising given that our estimate of 
the speed of convergence is comparable to the speed of convergence in the more integrated 
U.S. market. 
4.5  Convergence to the absolute LOOP 
So far our discussion has focused on convergence to the relative version of the LOOP.  As 
mentioned at the beginning, this has traditionally been the focus of the literature on interna-
tional price convergence.  Next, we turn our attention to the absolute version of the LOOP. 
The nature of our data (disaggregate product level data) is ideal for testing this version of 
the LOOP. 
The basic equation we estimate to test for convergence to the absolute LOOP is: 
L 
i1Pi,k,t = /3Pi,k,t-1 + L II!:J.Pi,k,t-1 +  Ci,k,t 
1=1 
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(5) Note that this equation is similar to equation (1), except for the omission of the prod-
uct/country fixed effects.  The results from this specification are reported in Table 5, colunm 
1.  Column 2 of the same table reports results from a  specification that includes,  in ad-
dition to the right-hand side variables in (5),  the exchange rate change and its lags.  In 
both columns 1 and 2,  the hypothesis of a unit root is easily rejected.  The coefficient  f3  is 
negative, with t-statistics equal to -12 in column 3,  and -8.7 in colunm 4,  while the critical 
values according to Levin and Lin (1992) for T=25, N=250, and no intercepts, are -2.34 at 
the 1% level, and -1.67 at the 5% level.  Note, however, that the implied speeds of conver-
gence are substantially lower compared to our estimates when product/country fixed effects 
were included in the equation.  The f3  estimate of -.13 in column 1 implies a half-life of a 
shock of approximately 5 years, while the convergence coefficient of -.08 in colunm 2 implies 
a  half-life of 8.3 years.  These numbers seem more in line with the estimates traditionally 
obtained in the International literature on price convergence.  But while the estimates in 
the literature usually refer to convergence to the reative version (i.e., the half-lives represent 
the time that elapses until price differentials return to their long-run level), in our case the 
half-lives refer to convergence to the absolute LOOP (that is the time that elapses until price 
differentials are eliminated). In this sense, one can claim that our results on convergence are 
much stronger than the ones previously obtained for international markets. 
There are two obvious caveats to these results on absolute convergence. First, our analysis 
focuses on countries with more or less similar tax regimes.  Other European countries (such 
as the Scandinavian and Ireland) have substantially higher VAT rates, so convergence to the 
absolute LOOP might be very hard to establish with respect to these countries. Second, the 
specification (5)  pools data across products. Including product (but not country) dummies 
reduces the estimated f3  coefficients to values  around -0.20,  but in this case there is no 
correspondence between our specification and the specifications considered in Levin and 
Lin.  Accordingly, the appropriate critical values for testing the unit root hypothesis are not 
available to usP  We therefore employed an alternative approach and estimated equation 
12The results from  specifications that include product specific,  but not country specific  dummies,  are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.  Given that the critical values are not available to us, we cannot 
24 (5)  on a product-by-product basis.  There are too many coefficients to report in this case, 
but the general picture that emerges  from the estimation supports our conclusions from the 
previous paragraph: the estimated convergence speed is substantially lower when we test for 
the absolute version,  compared to the specification with the country fixed  effects.  The f3 
coefficients vary from -0.15 to -0.05, implying half-lives between 4 and 13 years.  While the 
majority of the coefficients are statistically significant, the number of the ones that are not, 
is substantial. 
Overall, our results on the absolute version of the LOOP indicate that, while the hypoth-
esis of a unit root is rejected, the results are weaker compared to the tests for the relative 
version.  The fact that the fixed effects estimated in equations (1) and (2) were jointly sig-
nificant, also argues in favor of the hypothesis that deviations from the absolute LOOP still 
exist - even if  we cannot formally reject convergence when estimating equation (5).  This 
is not surprising given that, as discussed in Section 2,  impediments to arbitrage still exist 
in European markets.  Nevertheless,  our estimates of the trend variables in the previous 
subsection in conjunction with the results on absolute convergence suggest that violations 
of the LOOP are diminishing over time, and are certainly not as pronounced as previously 
found in studies of international markets. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper set out to investigate convergence to the LOOP in international markets using 
detailed product-level data from a period and a region that were characterized by a distinct 
effort to integrate national markets.  H there were one case where we would expect to find 
support for the LOOP, it would be in this setting.  Our results confirmed this expectation. 
Our findings provide strong evidence in favor of both the absolute and relative versions of 
the LOOP that contrasts with earlier evidence on international price dispersion. 
In particular, there are two features of our results that distinguish them from those of 
formally test the unit root hypothesis in these two cases.  But we can get an idea in which direction the (:J 
coefficients change when product dummies are included. 
25 previous studies:  (1)  When testing for the relative version of PPP we estimate half-lives of 
shocks (1.3--1.6 years) that are substantially shorter than the ones estimated in earlier work; 
(2) We cannot reject the hypothesis of convergence to the absolute LOOP. While our findings 
regarding the absolute LOOP are not directly comparable to other international studies (as 
pointed out before, international studies usually focus on relative PPP)  , it is remarkable that 
the half-lives of shocks we estimate under absolute PPP (5 to 8 years) correspond roughly to 
the half-lives estimated by other researchers under relative PPP. A comparison to the results 
of Parsley and Wei (1996) for the domestic market is also instructive. Our half-life estimates 
under relative PPP are similar in magnitude to the ones obtained by Parsley and Wei under 
absolute PPP. At the same time,  the country/product fixed  effects  capturing long-term, 
persistent price differentials across markets,  are jointly significant.  Under absolute PPP, 
our half-life estimates are noticeably higher.  These results taken together suggest that one 
important difference between domestic and international markets may be the presence of the 
fixed effects.  Even so, the evidence we presented suggests that these effects are declining over 
time, making the distinction between national and international markets less pronounced. 
This is after all what economic integration in Europe was supposed to achieve. 
We would like to conclude by reminding the reader once again that our results refer to a 
market that has undergone many changes in the last two decades in order to become more 
integrated.  We are therefore hesitant to generalize our findings to other markets.  Rather, 
we view them as evidence that the progress towards integration in Europe has had visible 
effects on cross-country price dispersion that are reflected in tests of the LOOP. 
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29 Table 1:  Summary Statistics for the European Car Market13 
BE  FR  GE  IT  UK  ALL 
1980 value-added tax: (in %)  25  33  13  18  23 
1990 value-added tax: (in %)  25  25  14  19  24 
Total sales (in 1,000 units)  384.4  1920.3  2508.9  1908.0  1704.1  8412.3 
(48.9)  (192.1)  (359.7)  (293.4)  (248.9)  (892.4) 
Parallel imports (in 1,000 units)  NjA  5-40  30-60  10-75  1-50 
Japanese market share (in %) 
in 1971  7.2  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.9 
in 1980  24.6  2.9  10.4  0.1  11.9  7.6 
in 1998  15.5  4.8  12.0  6.4  15.0  11.5 
Japanese quota (in %)  3.0  15.0  1.0  11.0 
Domestic market share (in %)  2.5  66.6  70.2  58.2  55.1 
(.4)  (5.1)  (4.0)  (6.2)  (4.0) 
European average (in %)  1.6  24.6  33.4  16.7  12.1 
(.5)  (2.6)  (1.9)  (1.4)  (1.5) 
C1-ratio (in %)  16.3  33.5  30.2  53.9  28.7  15.7 
(1.8)  (1.7)  (1.2)  (5.2)  (3.3)  (1.6) 
(VW)  (PSA)  (VW)  (Fiat)  (Ford)  (Fiat) Thble 2:  Results for basic specification with product/country fixed effects 
Dep. Variable, 6.PW I 
Base:  BE  Base: GE  No Base 
Pi,k,t-l  -0.41  -0.38  -0.48  -0.42  -0.37  -0.32 
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
t!.ek,t  -0.76  -0.66  -0.77 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
t!.ek,t-l  -0.14  -0.08  -0.08 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
t!.ek,t-2  0.05  0.09  0.08 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
t!.ek,t-3  0.03  0.08  0.05 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Be  -0.05  -0.04 
(0.005)  (0.004) 
Fr  0.02  0.03  -0.02  -0.00  0.02  0.03 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Ge  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.03 
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
It  0.04  0.07  0.00  0.02  0.04  0.07 
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
UK  0.07  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.07  0.08 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
lags of t!.Pi,k,t  yes(3)  yes (3)  yes(3)  yes(3)  yes(3)  yes(3) 
prod.-count. dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
time dUlllllies  no  no  no  no  yes  yes 
1 Averages. over 1980-95.  Standard deviations in parenthesis. Table 3:  Results for Country-Pairs2 
FR  GE  IT  UK 
BE  -0.45  -0.56  -0.35  -0.46 
(0.025)  (0.056)  (0.033)  (0.077) 
FR  -0.60  -0.50  -0.58 
(0.028)  (0.019)  (0.065) 
GE  -0.42  -0.53 
(0.001)  (0.0039) 
IT  -0.38 
(0.0034) 
2The estimated specifications include product fixed effects.  The table reports the estimated (3 coefficients 
from  bilateral regressions,  with standard errors in parentheses.  For  example,  the coefficient -0.45 in the 
upper-left comer corresponds to a regression in which the dependent variable is the first difference of the 
Belgium-France price differential; the second number in the first row corresponds to the Belgium-Germany 
regression,  etc.  The reported specifications did not include exchange rate change lags.  The results with 
exchange rate changes were very similar. Table 4: The Effects of the Integration Process 
(Base Country: Belgium) 
Dep. Variable:  APi,k,t 
Pi,k,t-l  -0.45  -0.46 
(0.015)  (0.017) 
Pi,k,t-l *  trend  0.002 
(0.001) 
Fr  0.07  0.07 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Fr *  trend  -0.003  -0.003 
(0.0003)  (0.0004) 
Ge  0.01  0.01 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Ge *  trend  0.001  0.001 
(0.0003)  (0.0004) 
It  0.17  0.17 
(0.007)  (0.007) 
It *  trend  -0.007  -0.007 
(0.0004)  (0.0004) 
UK  0.13  0.13 
(0.006)  (0.006) 
UK *  trend  -0.003  -0.003 
(0.0003)  (0.0004) 
lags of APi,k,t  yes(3)  yes(3) 
exchange rate change and lags  yes  yes 
prod.-count. dummies  yes  yes '!able 5: Convergence to the Absolute LOOP? 
(Base Country: Belgium) 
Dep. Variable:  D..Pi,k,t  II 
Pi,k,t-l  -0.13  -0.08  -0.28  -0.21 
(0.010)  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
D..ek,t  -0.81  -0.78 
(0.024)  (0.024) 
D..ek,t-l  0.05  -0.02 
(0.029)  (0.027) 
D..ek,t-2  0.26  0.19 
(0.027)  (0.027) 
D..ek,t-3  0.27  0.18 
(0.027)  (0.027) 
lags of D..Pi,k,t  yes(3)  yes(3)  yes(3)  yes(3) 
prod.-count. dummies  no  no  no  no 
only country dummies  no  no  no  no 
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Figure 1:  Evolution of car price differentials, relative to Belgium 150 
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Figure 3:  Long term average price differentials by segment, relative to Belgium 